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Preface
“Change”wasthebuzzwordof theU.S.presidentialcampaign,inresponseto
a political agenda precipitated by financial turmoil and a global economic
crisis. According to Research Associate Thomas I. Palley, the neoliberal eco-
nomic policy paradigm underlying the current agenda must itself change if
there is to be a successful policy response to the crisis. He observes that the
financial downturn has exposed the faulty economics of the existing policy
paradigm,thus presenting the opportunity for real change,but that there are
profound political, intellectual, and sociological obstacles to such change.
The ideology of the economics profession—mainstream economic
theory—remains unreformed, says Palley,and he warns of a return to failed
policies if a deep crisis is averted.Since Post Keynesians accurately predicted
that the U.S. economy would implode from within, there is an opportunity
for Post Keynesian economics to replace neoliberalism with a more success-
ful approach.
Palley outlines the policy challenges, noting that there is significant
disagreementamongeconomic paradigmsabouthowtoensurefullemploy-
ment and shared prosperity. A salient feature of the neoliberal economy,
which is supported by mainstream economic theory (e.g.,free trade,dereg-
ulation, and the notion of a natural rate of unemployment), is the discon-
nectbetweenwagesandproductivitygrowththatexplainswideningincome
inequality.Workers are boxed in on all sides by globalization, labor market
flexibility, concern with inflation rather than with full employment, and a
belief in“small government”that has eroded economic rights and govern-
ment services.Financialization,the economic foundation of neoliberalism,
serves the interests of financial markets and top management.Thus,revers-
ing the neoliberal paradigm requires a policy agenda that addresses finan-
cializationandensuresfinancialmarketsandcorporationsaremoreclosely
aligned with the greater public interest.Palley outlines several major obstacles to changing both economics
andeconomicpolicy.Socialdemocraticpoliticalpartiesaredividedinterms
of the merits of the neoliberal economic paradigm.Other obstacles include
the dominance of neoliberal economics within the academic community
and among policymakers, which is supported by a misplaced belief that
neoclassical economics is a scientific fact. This belief is used by the aca-
demic establishment to block alternative points of view.
New Keynesian economics is a form of real-business-cycle theory in
the tradition of Arthur C. Pigou rather than John Maynard Keynes, says
Palley.ThoughmainstreameconomistsarewillingtorecommendKeynesian
policies in times of economic crisis, they are unwilling to change the core
analytical assumptions driving modern neoclassical macroeconomics (an
exampleof so-called“cuckoo”economics).Theonlysatisfactoryescapefrom
this intellectual and political stew is the creation of a new, progressive
Keynesian consensus. That will require placing economics at the center of
the political stage.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
January 2009
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Introduction: Crisis, Economists, and Change
The current moment of financial crisis and the prospect of deep recession
offerahistoricwindowof opportunityforchangeineconomicsandineco-
nomic policy. The combination of crisis and accumulated popular resent-
ments following two decades of wage restraint, widening income inequality,
and increased economic insecurity makes for a political atmosphere con-
ducive to change.
In the 1930s and ’40s,the Great Depression andWorldWar II provided
the launchpad for the Keynesian revolution in economics. In the 1970s,
monetarists and New Classical economists used the economic crisis created
by the OPEC oil shocks to launch a counterrevolution (Johnson 1971).
Milton Friedman, the intellectual godfather of American neoliberal
economics, understood the role of crisis in fostering change:
There is enormous inertia—a tyranny of the status quo—in private
and especially governmental arrangements. Only a crisis—actual or
perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions
that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.
(Friedman 2002, pp. xiii–xiv)
He went on to describe the role of economists as follows:
. . . to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and
availableuntilthepoliticallyimpossiblebecomespoliticallyinevitable.
(Friedman 2002, p. xiv)
The good news is,current conditions may have created a crisis moment
in which policy and thinking can change. The bad news is, deep recession
After the Bustmeans there will likely be enormous economic suffering, and the econom-
ics profession will be profoundly resistant to change.
The Postbust Policy Challenge
European governments and the U.S. president face three challenges:
(1) Stop the bleeding—which means stopping the liquidation trap (Palley
2008a) that currently grips markets. This requires putting a floor
under the financial crisis by stopping further wholesale asset price
deflation and restoring credit flows.
(2) Jump-start the economy—which means getting the economy and
employment growing again. This requires further monetary easing
and massive fiscal expansion.
(3) Ensurethatfuturegrowthischaracterizedbyfullemploymentandshared
prosperity—which means having wages grow with productivity and
reducing current high-income inequality to levels that prevailed 30
years ago, before the neoliberal economic policy experiment.
Among policymakers, there is significant agreement on challenges (1)
and (2), but significant disagreement on challenge (3).
Regarding the first two challenges,any differences are largely a matter of
degree—such as, What is the best way to thaw credit markets and stabilize
asset prices? How far should interest rates be lowered and how fast? How
muchshouldtaxesbecut,andwhosetaxesshouldbecut?Howmuchshould
government spending be increased and what form should it take?1 These are
important differences, but as President Nixon famously observed in 1971,
“We are all Keynesians now.”The truth of that statement is being confirmed
by current policy developments,though Nixon should more accurately have
said,“In a recession, we are all Keynesians.”
However, there is significant disagreement regarding the challenge of
ensuring economic growth with shared prosperity. For most mainstream
economists, the crisis is being represented as a perfect storm, the result of a
rare probability event. From a post-Keynesian perspective (Godley 2000,
2001,2005;Palley1998,2001,2005,2006a,2006b),itisapredictableoutcome
of theeconomicparadigmthathasdrivengrowthsincetheneoliberalerawas
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inaugurated, in the early 1980s, by Prime Minister Thatcher and President
Reagan. That paradigm is now exhausted. It was never able to generate
growth with shared prosperity; now it is unable even to generate growth
with inequality.
The Neoliberal Paradigm and Mainstream Economics
The single most salient feature of the neoliberal economy is the disconnect
between wages and productivity growth, as exemplified by the U.S. experi-
ence. Figure 1 shows an index of U.S. productivity and average compensa-
tion (which includes all benefits) of nonsupervisory workers,who represent
80 percent of the workforce. Until the late 1970s, the two series grew
together; since then, they have grown apart, with compensation stagnating
even as productivity has continued to rise. Figure 2 tells the same story for
the relation between U.S. median family income and productivity.
Figure 1 Index of Productivityand HourlyCompensationof
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This disconnect in turn explains widening income inequality. With
wages stagnating at the bottom of the distribution but productivity still ris-
ing, income has been shifting to the top of the distribution. This pattern is
captured in Figure 3, which shows income growth at the 20th and 95th
percentiles of the U.S. income distribution. The two income series grew in
tandem until the late 1970s but separated after 1980, when inequality also
started rising.
The neoliberal economic policy paradigm can be described in terms of
a box, as illustrated in Figure 4.2 Workers are “boxed in” on all sides by a
policy matrix consisting of globalization, labor market flexibility, a focus
on inflation rather than full employment, and the erosion of popular eco-
nomic rights (as exemplified by the 1996 welfare reform act) in the name
of “small government.”Similarly, there has been an erosion of government’s
administrative capacity and its ability to provide services, with many gov-
ernment functions being outsourced to corporations. This has created a
“predator state”(Galbraith 2008) in which corporations enrich themselves
on the back of government contracts while the workers who provide these
privately produced–publicly funded services are placed in a more hostile
work environment. The result is the appearance of Big Government. The
reality is a government whose capacity has been significantly cannibalized.
The strength of the neoliberal policy box derives from a new relation-
ship between the“side supports”of corporations and financial markets, as
Figure 4 The“Neoliberal”PolicyBox
Less Than Full Employment
Small Government Globalization
Labor Market Flexibility
WORKERSillustrated in Figure 5.This new relationship has been termed“financializa-
tion” (Epstein 2001, Palley 2008b), and the box would collapse without it.
Figure 6 shows the economic workings of financialization. The basic
logic is that financial markets have captured control of corporations,which
now serve market interests along with the interests of top management.That
combination drives corporate behavior and economic policy, creating an
economic matrix that puts wages under continuous pressure and raises
income inequality.Viewed from this perspective,financializationistheeco-
nomic foundation of neoliberalism. Reversing the neoliberal paradigm
therefore requires a policy agenda that addresses both financial markets
and corporations, with the aim of bringing their behavior in line with the
greater public interest.
The structure of the policy box has been supported by mainstream eco-
nomictheory,whichhasprovidedjustificationfortheseoutcomes.Neoliberal
globalization has been justified by appeal to the theory of free trade based
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upon comparative advantage,and to neoclassical arguments for deregulating
financial markets and allowing uncontrolled international capital flows.
ThecaseforsmallgovernmentisbasedonFriedman’s(2002)arguments
for a minimalist, or night watchman, state. Moreover, the Chicago School of
Economics recommends that even market failures be ignored, since govern-
ment intervention to fix them can give rise to even more costly failures.
The retreat from full employment has been driven by New Classical
macroeconomics, which substituted the notion of a natural rate of unem-
ployment and a vertical Phillips curve for the negatively sloped long-run
Phillips curve (Friedman 1968). In the process, concern with inflation has
replaced concern about employment. The theoretical justification is that
policy can have no permanent impact on employment, and that the mar-
ket by itself gravitates quickly to full employment.
The push for so-called“flexible”labor markets has been driven by the
neoclassical construction of labor markets based on marginal productivity
theory (e.g.,that competitive markets ensure labor is paid fairly for its con-
tribution to production). That theory has fueled an attack on unions, the
minimum wage, and employment protections, all of which are character-
ized as labor market“distortions.”
Increased corporate power has been justified by the shareholder-value
model of corporations, which claims that wealth and income are maxi-
mized if firms maximize shareholder value without regard to other inter-
ests. To the extent that there is a principal-agent problem with managers
not maximizing shareholder value, this is to be solved by aligning man-
agers’ interests with shareholder interests via bonus payments and stock
options.
Lastly,expansion of financial markets has been promoted by appeal to
the theory of efficient markets (Fama 1970), claims that speculation is sta-
bilizing (Friedman 1953),and the notion of a market for corporate control
that ensures firms are disciplined by shareholders (Jensen and Meckling
1976). Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu’s (1954) contingent-claims
approach to financial markets has been used to justify exotic financial
innovations in the name of risk spreading and portfolio diversification,
while q theory (Tobin and Brainard 1968) has been used to support the
claim that financial markets do a good job of directing investment and the
accumulation of real capital.An Alternative, Progressive Box
The neoliberal policy box is suggestive of an alternative, “progressive
Keynesian”box that would supplant workers with corporations and finan-
cial markets,as shown in Figure 7.This requires redesigning and repacking
the box as follows:
(1) Globalization, with labor and environmental standards that promote
upward harmonization instead of a race to the bottom. Additionally,
international economic governance arrangements are to be strength-
ened, especially regarding exchange rates, so as to prevent a repeat of
the recent huge global imbalances. Capital controls must also be a
legitimate part of the policy tool kit.
(2) A balanced approach to government that ensures government effi-
ciently provides public goods, health insurance, social insurance, edu-
cation, and needed infrastructure.
(3) Restoration of full employment as a policy priority.
(4) The promotion of labor markets that encourage creation of high-quality
jobs that pay fair wages, which grow with productivity.
(5) A corporate agenda that restricts managerial power by enhancing
shareholder control, places limits on managerial pay, limits unproduc-
tive corporate financial engineering, and represents other stakeholders.
(6) Financial market reform that consolidates and strengthens regulation,
limits speculation, increases transparency, and provides central banks
with tools (such as asset-based reserve requirements) to address asset
price bubbles.
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An Opportunity for Post Keynesian Economics
Mainstream macroeconomics completely failed to understand the fragility
and unsustainability of the current macroeconomic regime. The extent of
this failure cannot be overstated and it provides an opportunity for Post
Keynesian economics.That is because Post Keynesians (Godley 2000,2001,
2005; Palley 1998, 2001, 2005, 2006a, 2006b) predicted the outcomes that
have come to pass.
The economics profession has talked widely of“the Great Moderation.”
According to that hypothesis, the economy has become more stable and the
business cycle tamed through a combination of improvements in monetary
policy driven by improved economic theory, and innovations in financial
markets and business management that have spread risk, stabilized credit
flows, and reduced inventory fluctuations. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke is himself a strong proponent of the Great Moderation thesis:
“My view is that improvements in monetary policy, though certainly not
the only factor,have probably been the most important source of the Great
Moderation”(Bernanke 2004, p. 2).
Yet, the current financial crisis has shown the Great Moderation to
have been a period of artificial calm. Moreover, the crisis also lends cre-
dence to an alternative Post Keynesian interpretation (Palley 2008c) that
the Great Moderation was driven by a retreat from full employment that
reduced the income distribution conflicts that surround full employment,
and by reliance on the temporary but unsustainable stimulus of borrowing
to fuel growth.
Nothing epitomizes the mainstream’s failure more than former Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan’s admission to Congress, on October 23, 2008,
that his economic ideology was flawed and that the self-interest of lending
institutions had failed to protect shareholders. Greenspan’s approach to
financialregulationandtheconductof monetarypolicywaswidelyendorsed
bytheeconomicsprofession.Thus,whenheretiredfromtheFederalReserve,
in 2006, he was feted by the profession, with the liberal New Keynesian
economists Alan Blinder and Ricardo Reis declaring that Greenspan“has a
legitimate claim to being the greatest central banker who ever lived”
(Blinder and Reis 2005).
The Federal Reserve, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
leading economists on both sides of the Atlantic all provide clear evidenceof the lack of understanding. In March 2007, current Fed Chairman
Bernanke testified before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress that
“the impact on the broader economy and financial markets of the prob-
lems in the sub-prime market seems likely to be contained” (Bernanke
2007). And throughout 2007 and into 2008, district Federal Reserve Bank
Presidents Jeffrey Lacker (Richmond), Charles Plosser (Philadelphia), and
Thomas Hoenig (Kansas City) all consistently played up the danger of
inflation rather than financial crisis and slump.
The IMF has laid claims to being the global economy’s early warning
system.YetinJuly2007,justasthecrisiswasabouttoerupt,theIMF(2007)
revised its global growth forecast upward, emphasizing that inflation risks
had edged up and central banks would likely need to further tighten mon-
etary policy.Even more than the IMF,the European Central Bank seems to
have misunderstood the financial crisis, which explains its resistance to low-
ering interest rates in 2007 and much of 2008. The same also holds for the
Bank of England.
HarvardprofessorandformerIMFChief EconomistKenRogoff (2008b)
also focused on inflation, writing as late as July 2008 that the global econ-
omy was a “runaway train” requiring tighter monetary and fiscal policy.
Moreover,Rogoff (2008c)misunderstoodthesignificanceof thecollapseof
Lehman Brothers,celebrating it with an article titled“No More Creampuffs”
that argued Lehman’s failure would put an end to moral hazard and restore
healthy business incentives.
British economist Willem Buiter (2008) also failed to see the system’s
instability, virulently criticizing the Federal Reserve for its decision in
January 2008 to cut the federal funds rate by 75 basis points, from 4.25 to
3.50 percent.Likewise,the politically liberal Paul Krugman (2008) failed to
appreciate the extent of speculation in oil and commodity markets,ration-
alizing the surge in oil and commodity prices in 2008 as the result of mar-
ket fundamentals rather than speculation.
With regard to the global economy, proponents of the so-called
“Revised Bretton Woods”(RBW) hypothesis (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and
Garber 2003) claimed the huge global financial imbalances associated with
the U.S. trade deficit were stable and sustainable. Another argument for
sustainability came from Harvard professor and former Inter-American
Development Bank Chief Economist Ricardo Hausman (2005), who, with
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his colleague Federico Sturzenegger, claimed the U.S. trade deficit was a
nonissue because of “dark matter” investments that yielded huge excess
returns to U.S. overseas investments.
Where there was mainstream criticism regarding the U.S.trade deficit,
it was strikingly wrong.Thus,some economists (Eichengreen 2004;Obstfeld
and Rogoff 2007; Rogoff 2007, 2008a; Bergsten 2005) predicted a run on
the dollar,while others (Goldstein and Lardy 2005) predicted China’s infla-
tion would force a rebalancing.
Noneof thishascometopass.Instead,theU.S.economyhasimploded
from within as predicted by Post Keynesians, sending shock waves around
the world. Far from collapsing, the dollar has actually strengthened during
the crisis, as the extent of global economic dependence on the U.S. con-
sumer as buyer of last resort has become clear.
Mainstream economists have been intellectually honest and guided by
their theoretical models. The problem is, events have conclusively shown
their theoretical analysis to be fundamentally flawed.Both in its theory and
empirical analysis, mainstream macroeconomics failed to connect the dots
linking the weak U.S. expansion, the U.S. trade deficit, and the U.S. hous-
ing bubble. It also failed to connect long-term developments in the U.S.
economy concerning expanding debt, wage stagnation, and worsening
income distribution.
This contrasts with Post Keynesian economics, which got it right and
provides clear justification for the type of fiscal and monetary policies being
implemented.ForPostKeynesians,thechallengeistowinrecognitionforthis
record,as the mainstream profession will try to airbrush the past and rewrite
history by burying its own failures and ignoring the success of its critics.
Obstacles to Change
Though the current moment provides an opportunity for change in both
economics and economic policy, there are a number of major obstacles to
overcome.
A.Politics and the Split among Social Democrats
A first obstacle concerns politics, and the fact that social democratic polit-
ical parties—including the Democratic Party in the United States, theLabour Party in the United Kingdom, and the Social Democratic Party in
Germany—are split regarding the neoliberal economic paradigm.
Figure 8 illustrates this split. At the most fundamental level there is a
divide between those who see the neoliberal economic paradigm as sound
(e.g., neoliberals and Third Way social democrats) and those who see it as
intrinsically flawed (labor social democrats). The political problem is that
these opposing views split social democrats, making it harder to dislodge
the paradigm. Neoliberals continue to promote the paradigm, and their
response to the crisis has been to try and shift blame onto government,
arguing that the crisis is another example of government failure. For
instance,U.S.conservatives (see,for example,Schiff 2008) are falsely blam-
ing the government-sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac for causing the crisis.The Community Reinvestment Act (1977),which
aims to promote homeownership among disadvantaged communities, has
also been falsely blamed.3
Third Way social democrats also remain committed to the neoliberal
model. The key difference separating them from neoliberals is that they sup-
port stronger financial regulatory reform as well as“helping hand”programs
to assist those adversely affected by the market. In the United States, the
ThirdWay“New Democrat”explanation of the BushAdministration’s eco-
nomic failure is that it abandoned budget discipline and pursued inegali-
tarian tax and social policies. That is a critique of policy rather than a





Figure 8 ThePoliticalDilemmaof Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism
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This Third Way acceptance of the neoliberal economic paradigm
creates a division with labor social democrats who support progressive
Keynesianism. That division in turn creates a major political conundrum.
On the one hand, if labor social democrats split from Third Way social
democrats, they risk bringing about a full-blown neoliberal triumph. On
the other hand, if they maintain their fractious union, the risk is a gradual
entrenchment of neoliberalism. The only satisfactory solution is the cre-
ation of a new, progressive Keynesian consensus that places economics
front and center on the political stage.
B.Intellectual Opinion
The importance of economics points to a second obstacle to change: the
intellectual dominance of neoliberal economics in academic and public pol-
icydiscourse.Thoughthecurrentcrisishascreatedanopportunitytounseat
neoliberalism and bring the“Age of Milton Friedman”to an end, events are
running ahead of the climate of opinion, which remains dominated by
neoliberalism.The political environment may have become more favorable,
butagenerationof miseducationimpedeschange.Thatmiseducationaffects
policymakers, economic advisers, think tanks, and the media alike.
The dominant analytical framework among economists is the neoclas-
sical, dynamic, general equilibrium, real-business-cycle model, which is
adjusted to include price rigidities by so-called “New Keynesians.” The
assumptions of this model—competitive market clearing, the “loanable
funds” theory of interest rates, and the neoclassical theory of labor mar-
kets—lace both professional and public discourse.These assumptions gen-
erate the conventional neoliberal prescriptions regarding labor market
flexibility; balanced budgets; the desirability of unimpeded international
financial flows and free trade; monetary policy guided by the natural rate
of unemployment; and supply-side economics, which emphasizes tax cuts.
Theimplicationisthat,aslongaseconomicthinkingremainsdominated
by the neoclassical, dynamic, general equilibrium, real-business-cycle frame-
work, mainstreameconomics will continuetobeamajor obstacle to change.
C.The Sociology of Economics
The importance of intellectual understandings in turn spotlights a third
obstruction to change: the sociology of the economics profession, whichoperates to exclude and ignore alternative points of view. This practice is
justified by appealing to a myth that claims neoclassical economics is a sci-
entifically proven truth, while opposing views are scientifically wrong.
The neoclassical“science”myth plays a critical function,which explains
the repeated claim that neoclassical economics is science. This function
supports the sociological practice that has mainstream economists labeling
dissidents as wrong. That in turn justifies purging dissidents from ortho-
dox economics departments and ignoring them in heterodox departments,
thereby stripping dissidents of intellectual standing and diminishing their
capacity to challenge the neoliberal paradigm.
The deeper sociological problem is that academic economics is a club
in which new members are elected by existing members.Today,club mem-
bers only elect those who subscribe to the current dominant paradigm, as
thisbehaviorisjustifiedbythesciencemyth.Thisposesanintractablesoci-
ological obstruction to alternative points of view and the possibility of fun-
damental change (Palley 1997).
D.Cuckoo Economics
Lastly,thereistheobstacleof“cuckoo”economics.Thecuckoobirdsurrep-
titiously places its eggs in the nests of other birds, which then raise its
young. In many regards, neoliberal economics does the same to Keynesian
economics. This serves to create confusion, blur distinctions, and promote
the claim that Keynesian ideas are already fully incorporated in mainstream
economic thought and have nothing further to contribute.
The practice of cuckoo economics is evident in the tendency of main-
stream economists to recommend Keynesian policies in times of economic
crisis. Thus, many economists support expansionary discretionary fiscal
policy and robust interest rate reductions in such situations, even though
their theoretical models are hard pressed to justify such actions.
New Keynesianism is the ultimate example of cuckoo economics. It is
impossible to read John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory (1936) and
believe that his theory of unemployment rests on the combination of imper-
fect competition and price adjustment “menu” costs. However, that is the
New Keynesians’ claim, and their adoption of the “Keynesian” label serves
to confuse debate and dismiss authentic Keynesian claims about the exclu-
sion of Keynesianism (see, for instance, DeLong 2007). The reality is that
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New Keynesian economics is a form of real-business-cycle theory.It should
really be called“New Pigovian economics,”as it is firmly in the tradition of
Arthur C. Pigou rather than Keynes.
The latest example of cuckoo economics is “hip” orthodoxy and
behavioral economics (Hayes 2007). Thus, some mainstream economists
are now embracing ideas from social psychology that critics of the main-
stream have long talked about. These ideas include concerns with relative
standing (Veblen 1899, Duesenberry 1949), fairness, and less-than-perfect
rationality. The trick behind the new behavioral paradigm is that it draws
on arguments made by critics of the mainstream but adopts only those
ideas that leave unchanged the core analytical assumptions driving modern
neoclassical macroeconomics (Palley 2007).
This capacity to selectively incorporate ideas reflects the amoeba-like
character of neoliberal economics, which, though dented by recent events,
hasanastoundingcapacitytoreinventitself withoutrealchange.Theimpli-
cation is that neoliberal economics has not been staked through the heart,
and it therefore promises to rise again, like a zombie, when times stabilize.
Conclusion: The Outlook for Macroeconomics and
Macroeconomic Policy
The depth of the current economic crisis means there will almost certainly
beapolicyturninaKeynesian,orevenaPostKeynesian,direction.However,
there are profound political, intellectual, and sociological obstacles blocking
any fundamental change to macroeconomics. In particular, the economics
profession and its ideology remain unreformed.There is little indication of
shifts in core understandings concerning labor markets, globalization, and
the theory of the natural rate of unemployment. The only place where
there is evidence of substantive intellectual change is in attitudes toward
financial regulation (though even here,“market transparency”recommen-
dations dominate “quantitative requirements”). These obstacles will mute
the policy response to the crisis, and, if a deep economic downturn is
averted, will tend to encourage a return to the existing policy paradigm,
which has failed disastrously.Notes
1. With regard to jump-starting the economy, one major disagreement
concerns the treatment of debt. Progressive Keynesians prefer policies
andlegislationthatfacilitatecancelinghouseholddebts,whereasneolib-
erals strongly oppose this action and seek government bailouts of
financial institutions without obligating those institutions to cancel
outstanding debts.
2. The box analogy is attributable to Ron Blackwell, chief economist for
the AFL-CIO.
3. See Ritholtz (2008a, 2008b) for a rejection of the claim that the hous-
ing crisis was caused by the Community Reinvestment Act and a fail-
ure to regulate the government-sponsored mortgage lenders Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.
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